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Nothing is Sacred:
Why Georgia and California Cannot Bar
Contractual Jury Waivers in Federal Court
Brian S. Thomley*
INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have long recognized that the right to a civil jury trial
may be waived in advance by private agreement.1 But contractual jury
waivers are now unenforceable under Georgia and California law.2 No one
has explored whether the Erie doctrine requires federal courts exercising
diversity jurisdiction in Georgia and California to bar these waivers under
Georgia or California law. This Comment proposes that federal courts
must continue to enforce these waivers under federal law.
Part I compares federal law on contractual jury waivers with the laws
of the states. While federal statutes do not expressly allow these waivers,
federal courts enforce them because the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) have endosed similar pre-dispute
agreements.3 Georgia and California courts, unlike the courts of other
states, bar these waivers because they are not expressly allowed by statute.
But  these  states’  legislatures do not necessarily prohibit these waivers.
Part II compares federal interests in enforcing contractual jury waivers
with   Georgia’s   and   California’s   interests   in   barring   them.      Federal courts
have an interest in upholding agreements that reduce the expense and delay
of litigation for parties and courts. Georgia and California, however, have
an interest in preventing parties from unfairly bargaining away the
constitutional right to a jury trial.
Part III traces the U.S.   Supreme   Court’s   development of the
constitutional doctrine from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,4 which
provides that federal courts sitting in diversity must  apply  the  ‘substantive’  
*
J.D. Candidate 2009, Chapman University School of Law. I wish to thank Professor Henry
Noyes for the idea for this Comment and Professors Nhan Vu and Lisa Litwiller for their invaluable
direction and insight. I dedicate this Comment to my ever loving and supportive wife, Christi.
1 See Debra T. Landis, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Civil Cases, 92 A.L.R. FED.
688, 691 (1989); Jay M. Zitter, Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R.5TH 53,
53 (1996).
2 Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 800 (Ga. 1994); Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior
Court, 116 P.3d 479, 492 (Cal. 2005).
3 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000).
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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law of the state. As  for  state  ‘procedural’ rules, two alternative tests have
evolved. The   ‘guided’   Erie test generally requires the application of a
federal statute or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that covers the issue. If
no federal statute or Rule applies, the   ‘unguided’   Erie test requires the
application of state law if applying federal law would substantially affect
the outcome of litigation, unless there are countervailing federal interests.
Part IV proposes that the Erie doctrine requires federal courts to
continue to enforce contractual jury waivers under federal law. The Erie
doctrine applies because there is a conflict between federal and state law.
In Simler v. Conner, the U.S. Supreme Court commanded that federal law
govern the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Alternatively, this part
proposes that the FAA would control, because it satisfies both prongs of a
‘guided’   Erie test. First, the FAA is broad enough to cover the issue by
making arbitration agreements enforceable, because contractual jury
waivers are implicit parts of such agreements. Second, the FAA is a valid
exercise of Congress’  constitutional  power  to  regulate  procedure.
Alternatively, Part IV proposes that federal common law would
control under an ‘unguided’   Erie test. Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s  
Erie jurisprudence, the ‘knowing  and  voluntary’  standard  satisfies  the three
prongs of this test. First, whether a judge or jury decides a dispute is a
matter of procedure. Second, applying federal law would not substantially
affect the outcome of litigation. Third, even if the application of federal
law were outcome-determinative, federal interests in enforcing agreements
that make litigation more efficient outweigh Georgia’s   and   California’s
interests in protecting the right to a jury.
I. COMPARISON OF FEDERAL AND STATE LAW ON CONTRACTUAL
JURY WAIVERS
A.

The Federal Constitution and Statutes Allow Contractual Jury Waivers

The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that, in
civil cases in federal courts, “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”5
This provision says nothing about whether it may be waived. But the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely, said that this provision
requires federal courts to preserve the right to a jury, not the jury itself; and
“the   benefit   of   [this right] may, therefore,   be   relinquished.”6 Thus, the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury may be waived.
Congress has expressly recognized that parties may also waive their
rights to a jury during litigation. An 1865 act recognized waiver by written
stipulation to the clerk of court.7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to legislative authority,
5
6

See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819).
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incorporate the 1865 act by recognizing waiver by express stipulation.8
The Rules also allow waiver by failure to file a timely request for a jury
trial or by raising equitable issues that are not entitled to a jury trial.9
Parties may also waive their rights to a jury prior to litigation. In
1925, the FAA made arbitration agreements as enforceable as any other
contract.10 Parties that agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator
necessarily waive their rights in advance to submit that dispute to a jury.11
One may argue that the right to a jury only attaches once the parties have
submitted their dispute to a court of law. But the legislative history of the
FAA suggests that an arbitration agreement implicates the right to a jury by
stating that “[t]he   constitutional   right   to   a   jury   trial   is   adequately
safeguarded” in such agreements.12
Congress has not expressly recognized pre-litigation jury waivers
outside of arbitration agreements. But the U.S. Supreme Court commands
federal  courts  to  uphold  parties’  rights  to  enter  into  pre-dispute agreements
that do not clearly violate law or public policy.13 Thus, federal courts must
enforce valid contractual jury waivers unless Congress has expressly stated
or necessarily implied that they violate law or public policy.
Congress has never expressly stated or necessarily implied that
contractual jury waivers are contrary to law. In Kearney v. Case, the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted the 1865 act that allowed jury trial waiver by
written stipulation to the clerk of court.14 The Court observed that the
statute was ambiguous as to whether it excluded other methods of waiver.15
The Court concluded that, “both by express agreement in open court, and
by implied consent, the right to a jury trial could be waived.”16 Thus, the
Court affirmed a decision in which it had allowed waiver by private
agreement in advance of litigation.17 The FAA, likewise, does not indicate
that arbitration is the only method of waiving the jury prior to litigation.
Also, contractual jury waivers are not contrary to public policy.
Rather, the FAA declares a strong public policy favoring them. A primary
purpose of the FAA was to support agreements that reduce the expense and

Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 501 (current version at FED. R. CIV. P. 39).
FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a) (2008).
Id. 38(d), 39(a).
United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000)).
11 E.g., L & R Realty  v.  Conn.  Nat’l  Bank,  715  A.2d  748,  753  (Conn.  1998)  (“[J]ury  trial  waivers  
entered into in advance of litigation are similar to arbitration agreements in that both involve the
relinquishment  of  the  right  to  have  a  jury  decide  the  facts  of  the  case.”).
12 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (emphasis added).
13 See infra Part I.B.
14 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 275, 282 (1871).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 281 (citing Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819)).
7
8
9
10
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delay of litigation.18 Contractual jury waivers are implicit parts of
arbitration agreements and serve the same interests.19 Also, an arbitration
agreement  “involves  a  greater  compromise  of  procedural protections”  than  
a contractual jury waiver.20 Thus, “[p]ublic policy that permits parties to
waive trial altogether surely does not forbid waiver of trial by jury.”21
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Allows Contractual Jury Waivers
In 1819, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Bank of Columbia v. Okely,
enforced a contractual jury waiver.22 In Okely, the defendant made a note
negotiable at a bank whose charter provided for collection of debts by a
summary proceeding without a jury.23 The trial court held that this waiver
was void under the Seventh Amendment.24 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the waiver was valid and enforceable.25 The Court
reasoned that  the  defendant,  “in consideration of the credit given him . . .
voluntarily relinquished his claims to the ordinary administration of
justice”  by his “submission  to  the  law  of  the  contract.”26
In 1871, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Okely in Kearney v. Case.27
Thus, consistent with the  Court’s  view that courts must enforce agreements
that do not clearly violate law or public policy,28 pre-dispute agreements
are enforceable under federal law unless Congress has expressly stated or
necessarily implied that they are prohibited.
In 1874, the U.S. Supreme Court retreated from this view. In Home
Insurance Co. v. Morse, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld, under

See infra Part II.A.
See id.
See Telum, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1988).
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004). The Texas Supreme Court
explained why jury waivers are preferable to arbitration agreements:
By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right to
appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of the
reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and retain their
right to appeal. The parties obtain dispute resolution of their own choosing in a manner
already afforded to litigants in their courts. Their rights, and the orderly development of
the law, are further protected by appeal. And even if the option appeals only to a few,
some of the tide away from the civil justice system to alternate dispute resolution is
stemmed.
Id.
22 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819), construed in Rodenbur v. Kaufman, 320 F.2d 679, 684 (D.C.
Cir.  1963)  (“[P]arties,  at  least  in  situations where summary procedure is clearly to be desired, may in
advance  contract  to  waive  a  trial  by  jury.”),  and Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp.,
411 F. Supp. 670, 676–77  (E.D.  Va.  1975)  (“It  seems  clear  that  contractual  provisions  waiving  trial by
jury in civil actions are neither illegal nor contrary  to  public  policy.”).
23 Id. at 241.
24 Id. at 237–38.
25 Id. at 246.
26 Id. at 243.
27 See supra note 17.
28 See Baltimore & Oh. Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900).
18
19
20
21
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Okely, an agreement adopted pursuant to a state statute that waived a
foreign  insurance  company’s  rights  to  remove  a   lawsuit to federal court.29
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement was “illegal
and  void.”30 The Court added, in dicta:  “There  is  no  sound  principle  upon  
which [arbitration agreements and contractual jury waivers] can be
specifically  enforced.”31 The Court explained:
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights. . . .
In a civil case he may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an
arbitration, or to the decision of a single judge. So he may omit to exercise his
right to remove his suit to a Federal tribunal, as often as he thinks fit, in each
recurring case. In these aspects any citizen may no doubt waive the rights to
which he may be entitled. He cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an
agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.32

Under the reasoning of Morse, the rules of dispute resolution are fixed
by Congress and federal courts have no power to allow parties to alter them
by private agreement in advance of litigation.33 Thus, pre-dispute
agreements were considered illegal and against public policy unless
expressly authorized by statute.
The Court upheld Morse into the early twentieth century.34 The Court
did not embrace arbitration agreements until Congress made them
enforceable in 1925.35 Congress intended the FAA to reverse courts’  
refusals to enforce such agreements.36 Congress also intended that such
agreements were to be as enforceable as any other contract.37 Thus, the
Court has since enforced them if valid under ordinary contract law.38
In the late twentieth century, however, the Court rejected Morse by
enforcing pre-dispute agreements without legislative authority.39 In
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, the Court enforced an
agreement to appoint an agent for service of process under ordinary

29 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 447, 457 (1874), abrogated in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972).
30 Id. at 451, 458.
31 Id. at 450.
32 Id. at 451.
33 David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of
Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085,
1093 (2002).
34 Id. at 1094–95.
35 Id.
36 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).
37 Id. at 271; 9 U.S.C. § 2   (2000)   (“A   written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a
controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation  of  any  contract.”).
38 See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 170–72 (2004).
39 Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 33, at 1095.
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principles of agency.40 In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Court held
that a forum selection clause was presumptively enforceable if valid under
contract law.41 The Court in Bremen renounced a broad reading of Morse
and explained that such clauses should be enforceable because they
encourage freedom of contract and stimulate trade and commerce.42
The U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely held that contractual jury
waivers are enforceable. But Szukhent and Bremen have abrogated the
view in Morse that these waivers are contrary to law and public policy.
These decisions also herald a modern era in which parties have virtually
unlimited rights to control their disputes. G. Richard Shell argues that “the
modern Court has shown more fidelity to an absolute principle of freedom
to contract than  the  Courts  that  preceded  it.”43
C.

Federal Courts Enforce Contractual Jury Waivers if they were
‘Knowing and Voluntary’

In the late twentieth century, the lower federal courts began to enforce
contractual jury waivers.44 Federal   courts   recognize   that   “contractual  
provisions waiving trial by jury in civil actions are neither illegal nor
contrary   to   public   policy.”45 These courts analogize to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s   liberal enforcement of contractual jury waivers and other predispute agreements in Okely, Szukhent and Bremen.46
Federal courts enforce most pre-dispute agreements under state
contract law.47 But the U.S. Supreme Court commands that federal law
apply to contractual jury waivers. In Simler v. Conner, the federal court of
appeals in a diversity action denied   the   plaintiff’s   request   for   a   jury   trial  
because state law characterized his claims for relief as equitable.48 The
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal law controlled the
characterization of his claims.49 The Court commanded that  “the right to a
jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined as a matter of federal
law.”50 The Court explained that “[o]nly through a holding that the jury
trial right is to be determined according to federal law can the uniformity in

375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964).
407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2008).
Id. at 9–10 & n.10.
G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 433 (1993).
See generally id. at 452–62  (discussing  the  Court’s  presumptive enforcement of pre-dispute agreements
under cases such as Szukhent and Bremen).
44 See Landis, supra note 1, at 691.
45 E.g., Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. Va.
1975).
46 See, e.g., id. at 675–77.
47 See Ware, supra note 38, at 181–97.
48 372 U.S. 221, 221 (1963).
49 Id. at 222.
50 Id.
40
41
42
43
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its exercise which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be achieved.”51
In a criminal case, “[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be
voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”52 In
D.H. Overmyer Co. of Ohio v. Frick Co., the U.S. Supreme Court enforced
a waiver of due process rights to notice and a hearing in a civil case
because  it  was  “voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made.”53 Thus, after
Overmyer, federal   courts   “have   overwhelmingly   applied   the knowing and
voluntary standard” to determine whether the Seventh Amendment may be
waived.54 This standard is a constitutional one that is separate from, and
higher than, contract law.55
To determine whether a waiver was ‘knowing  and  voluntary,’ a court
examines (1) whether the waiver was conspicuous, (2) whether it was
negotiable, (3) the relative sophistication of the parties, and (4) their
relative bargaining power.56 The circuits are split as to which party has the
burden of proving whether a contractual jury waiver was knowing and
voluntary.57 Most circuits place the burden on the party seeking to enforce
the waiver because, “as  the  right  of  jury  trial  is  fundamental, courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver.”58 The Sixth Circuit places
the burden on the party seeking to avoid the waiver, applying a
“presumption  in  favor  of  validity  in  the  interest  of  liberty  of  contract.”59
D. The Courts of Most States Enforce Contractual Jury Waivers
States are not required to provide the right to a civil jury trial, because
the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied to the states.60 Nevertheless, every state provides
for the right, either by constitution or statute.61

Id.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
See 405 U.S. 174, 185–86 (1972).
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1985). Scholars disagree as to the
appropriate standard applicable to such waivers. E.g., compare Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 669 (2000) (knowing and voluntary) with Ware, supra note 38 (contract law).
55 See K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 755–56 (citing Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 183).
56 RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813–14 (N.D. Tex. 2002). See generally
Sternlight, supra note 54, at 677–95 (2000) (discussing how courts apply the factors under the knowing
and voluntary standard).
57 Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 813. See generally Joel Andersen, The Indulgence of Reasonable
Presumptions: Federal Court Contractual Civil Jury Trial Waivers, 102 MICH. L. REV. 104 (2003).
58 E.g., Nat’l   Equip.  Rental,   Ltd.   v.   Hendrix,   565   F.2d  255,   258   (2d   Cir.  1977)   (quoting Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
59 K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 758 (quoting 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
¶ 38.46, at 38-400 (2d ed. 1984)).
60 See Minn. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916).
61 Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 812 n.4.
51
52
53
54
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In the nineteenth century, state courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court in
Morse, did not enforce contractual jury waivers unless authorized by
statute. For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Nute v.
Hamilton Mutual Insurance Co., held that a forum selection clause in an
insurance policy was unenforceable as a matter of law.62 The court said, in
dicta, that the right to a jury may not be waived by private agreement.63
The court reasoned that the legislature cannot delegate to courts and parties
the power to alter the rules of dispute resolution because they “affect   the  
remedy,  and  are  created  and  regulated  by  law.”64 The court also said that
private agreements that alter these rules in advance were against public
policy by interfering with the convenience of having uniform rules.65
In the twentieth century, however, state courts rejected the view in
Nute and began to enforce contractual jury waivers without legislative
authority.66 As one court stated, these waivers   serve   the   “public   policy  
favoring   freedom   of   contract   and   the   efficient   resolution   of   disputes.”67
The states apply different standards to these waivers. Some states enforce
them under contract law, while others apply the knowing and voluntary
standard.68 Contractual jury waivers are unenforceable in Montana by
statute and in Oklahoma by constitutional provision.69 Georgia and
California have barred them by judicial decision.70
E.

The Georgia and California Supreme Courts Bar Contractual Jury
Waivers

1. Bank South, N.A. v. Howard
In 1994, the Georgia Supreme Court barred contractual jury waivers.
In Bank South, N.A. v. Howard, a bank lender suing a guarantor on a debt
sought to enforce a jury waiver provision in the guaranty.71 The trial court
struck   the   guarantor’s   request   for   a   jury   trial.72 The court of appeals
62 See 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 176, 185 (1856), abrogated by W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 555 N.E.2d 214 (Mass. 1990).
63 Id. at 181.
64 See id. at 180.
65 Id. at 184.
66 See Zitter, supra note 1.
67 L & R Realty v.  Conn.  Nat’l  Bank,  715  A.2d 748, 753 (Conn. 1998).
68 E.g., compare id. at 755 (applying ordinary contract law) with In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124, 134 (Tex. 2004) (applying the knowing and voluntary standard).
69 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-708 (2007)   (“Every stipulation or condition in a contract by
which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual
proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his
rights is void.”);; OKLA. CONST.  art.  XXIII,  §  8  (“Any  provision  of  a  contract,  express  or  implied,  made  
by any person, by which any of the benefits of this Constitution is sought to be waived, shall be null and
void.”).
70 See Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 493 (Cal. 2005) (Chin, J.,
concurring).
71 Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799, 799 (Ga. 1994).
72 Id.
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reversed, holding that the waiver was unenforceable because it was not
knowing and voluntary.73 The Georgia Supreme Court, affirming, ruled
that contractual jury waivers are unenforceable.74
Article I, section 1 of the Georgia Constitution provides:    “The right to
trial by jury shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall render
judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable
defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either
party.”75 A Georgia statute allows waiver by oral or written stipulation to
the court.76 The Bank South court stated that,   “[b]y   their   terms,   both the
statute and the Constitution plainly contemplate the pendency of litigation
at the time of the waiver.”77 Thus, methods of waiver expressly authorized
by the legislature are exclusive.78 The court distinguished contractual jury
waivers from arbitration agreements because the latter were expressly
authorized by statute.79 The court compared contractual jury waivers to
confessions of judgment, noting that the latter are only allowed during
pending litigation.80 The court also observed  “the  magnitude of the rights
involved and the probability of abuse that exists in both situations.”81
Justice Sears-Collins, dissenting, argued that contractual jury waivers
should be enforceable.82 She noted that the constitutional and statutory
provisions  “do not provide that their methods by which the right to a jury
trial can be waived are exclusive.”83 She argued that any ambiguity should
be resolved in favor of enforceability, because parties may enter into
agreements unless the legislature expresses or necessarily implies that the
agreement violates law or public policy.84 She pointed out that these
waivers “economize   litigation   for   the   parties   and   for   an   already  
overburdened court system.”85 She also argued that the parties that use
these clauses are sophisticated enough to understand their consequences.86
She criticized the  majority’s  analogy  to a confession of judgment, because
jury waivers forfeit only the right to a jury, but the  latter  “forfeits  a  panoply  
of constitutional and statutory rights, including the right to any trial
whatsoever.”87 Bank South has generated much criticism.88
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id. at 800.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ XI.
GA. STAT. § 9-11-39(a) (2008).
Bank South, 444 S.E.2d at 800.
See id.
Id. at n.5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 812 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (collecting
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2. Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court
In 2005, the California Supreme Court followed the Georgia Supreme
Court and barred contractual jury waivers. In Grafton Partners, L.P. v.
Superior Court, a partnership sued the accounting firm, Price
WaterhouseCoopers, L.L.P., for misrepresentation and other causes of
action after the partnership hired the firm to audit its accounts.89 The trial
court enforced a jury waiver provision in the retainer agreement.90 The
California Supreme Court, however, affirmed   the   court   of   appeal’s ruling
that contractual jury waivers are unenforceable.91
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution provides: “Trial by
jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all . . . . In a civil cause a
jury may be waived by the consent of the parties expressed as prescribed
by statute.”92 The corresponding provision in the 1849 constitution read:
“[A] jury trial may be waived by the parties in all civil cases in the manner
to be prescribed by law.”93 In Exline v. Smith, the California Supreme
Court found that, under this provision only the legislature could determine
how a jury may be waived.94 Exline invalidated an 1851 statute that
allowed California courts to prescribe their own methods.95 The Exline
court pontificated that,   “[t]he   right   of   trial   by   jury   is   too   sacred   in   its  
character to be frittered away or committed to the uncontrolled caprice of
every  judge  or  magistrate  in  the  State.”96
In Grafton, the California Supreme Court found that the present
constitution supported Exline’s   interpretation   of   the   former   one.97 The
constitutional convention of 1878-1879 considered proposals that deleted
the   “prescribed   by   law”   language and simply allowed parties to waive a
trial by jury.98 These proposals were voted down without explanation.99
The Grafton court reasoned that the convention, by reenacting this phrase
in substantially similar language, incorporated Exline’s   interpretation.100
Thus, the court concluded, the California Constitution provides that only
the legislature may determine how a jury may be waived.101
sources).
89 Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 479 (Cal. 2005).
90 Id. at 481.
91 Id. at 492.
92 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (emphasis added).
93 CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. I, § 3 (emphasis added).
94 5 Cal. 112, 112–13 (1855).
95 Id. at 112 (citing California Civil Practice Act, ch. 5, § 179, Stat. 1851, 78).
96 Id. at 113.
97 Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 483 (Cal. 2005).
98 1 E.B. WILLIS & P.K. STOCKTON, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 1878–1879, 253, 255, 303–05 (1880–1881). The
members  lauded  these  proposals  as  “safe  for  the  ends  of  justice  and  the  preservation of private rights
and  the  public  interest”  and  a  way  of  reducing  expensive  jury  trials.    See id.
99 See id.
100 Grafton, 116 P.3d at 479.
101 Id. at 482.
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The court found that Code of Civil Procedure section 631 supported
this conclusion.102 The   statute  reads:     “In   civil   cases,  a  jury   may   only be
waived”  in  six  specified  ways,  all of which occur during litigation.103 The
court  conceded  that  the  statute  was  “ambiguous  concerning  the  validity  of  
waivers  entered  into  prior  to  the  emergence  of  a  legal  dispute.”104 But the
court interpreted the statute strictly to preserve the right to a jury trial.105
The court opined that this provision “strongly suggests that waiver of the
right to jury trial must occur subsequent to the initiation of a civil
lawsuit.”106 Thus, the court concluded, “it is for the Legislature, not this
court, to determine whether, and under what circumstances, a pre-dispute
waiver of jury trial will be enforceable in this state.”107
The court conceded that contractual jury waivers support public
policies by conserving judicial resources and promoting freedom of
contract.108
The court also acknowledged that other states offer
extraordinary protections for the right to a jury.109 But the court was
“reluctant”  to  substitute  its  own  judgment  for  the  legislature’s  as  to  whether  
and in what circumstances these waivers should be enforceable.110 The
court defended the legislature’s decision to allow arbitration agreements
but to bar express jury waivers.111 The court explained that public policy
supports preserving jury trials only once litigation has begun.112 The court
also suggested that arbitration agreements conserve more judicial
resources.113 The court blithely dismissed the idea that its decision would
increase the number of arbitrations or jury trials.114
Justice Chin, concurring “reluctantly,” urged the California
Legislature to make contractual jury waivers enforceable.115 He found
“little  sense”  for the legislature to allow waiver by arbitration agreements
but to bar contractual waivers.116 The majority’s   decision   “should   not  
sound  the  death  knell”  for  these  waivers  because,  “[w]hile  the  public  policy  
favoring jury trials subjects jury waiver agreements to strict construction,
the application of that policy will not void every such agreement.”117 He
observed that other states enforce these waivers because there   is   “no  
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 485.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631(a) & (d) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
Grafton, 116 P.3d at 486.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 491–92.
Id. at 490.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 493 (Chin, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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abstract public policy against [them].”118 He noted that these waivers are
an   “attractive   middle   ground”   between   a   jury   trial   and   arbitration   by  
minimizing excessive jury awards while better   protecting   the   parties’  
rights.119 Grafton has, like Bank South, generated much criticism.120
F.

The Georgia and California Constitutions and Statutes do not
Necessarily Prohibit Contractual Jury Waivers

The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the principle, which Justice SearsCollins recognized in her dissent in Bank South, that pre-dispute
agreements are enforceable unless they clearly violate law or public
policy.121 Thus, contractual jury waivers are enforceable in Georgia and
California unless the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions clearly
express or necessarily imply otherwise. Any ambiguity must be interpreted
in favor of enforceability to uphold freedom of contract.
The Georgia constitutional and statutory provisions merely state
methods to waive a jury. Thus, these provisions do not expressly state or
necessarily imply that they prescribe the only methods.
The California constitutional provision states that a jury may be
waived as provided by statute. This provision, however, does not mean
that a jury may only be waived by statute. Similarly, a provision of the
Texas Constitution reads:  “The  Legislature  shall pass such laws as may be
needed  to  regulate  [the  right  to  a  jury].”122 But the Texas Supreme Court,
In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America held that a contractual jury trial
waiver was enforceable because “[n]othing  in  the  constitutional  provisions  
themselves suggests that parties are powerless to waive trial by jury under
any  other  circumstances,  before  or  after  suit  is  filed.”123
California’s constitutional history does not clearly indicate that the
means of waiver are reserved to the legislature alone. The earlier
constitutional provision did not expressly state or necessarily imply that a
jury may only be waived as “prescribed by law.” The debates shed no light
on whether the framers rejected proposals to delete this language to reserve
the methods of waiver to the legislature or whether they intended to
incorporate the rule from Exline. At best, this history merely suggests that
only the California Legislature may determine methods of waiver.

Id. at 493–94 (quoting Okura & Co. v. Careau Group, 783 F. Supp. 482, 488 (C.D. Cal. 1991)).
Id. at 493 (internal quotations omitted).
120 Julia B. Strickland & Stephen J. Newman, Shock Waives, 29 LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Mar.
2006, at 22 (arguing   that   Grafton   is   a   “paternalistic”   decision   that   will   reduce   certainty   in   the  
marketplace); Carl Grumer & Thomas McMorrow, A Call for Contractual Jury Waivers in California,
28 LOS ANGELES LAWYER, Dec. 2005, at 44 (arguing that Justice   Chin’s   call   “deserves strong and
widespread support”  because  Grafton will  harm  the  state’s  economy  by  increasing litigation costs).
121 See supra Part I.B.
122 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15.
123 148 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tex. 2004).
118
119
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California Code of Civil Procedure section 631, while stating that a
jury   may   be   waived   “only”   as   provided   therein, is inapplicable to
contractual jury waivers. In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the
California Supreme Court found arbitration agreements enforceable under
this  provision  because  it  “presupposes  a  pending  action”  and  thus  does  not  
apply to pre-dispute jury trial waivers.124 In Grafton, the court clarified
that Section 631 applies only once parties have submitted their dispute to a
court of law.125 Thus, because other statutes have not made arbitration the
only method of pre-dispute waiver, contractual jury waivers are
enforceable, despite this provision.
The Georgia and California supreme courts, unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court, saw legislative ambiguity as a complete bar on contractual jury
waivers. This drastic approach harks back to the outmoded views in Morse
and Nute rather than a sensible, modern view of pre-dispute agreements.
As the dissents in Bank South and Grafton pointed out, public policy that
supports arbitration agreements surely supports contractual jury waivers.
Further, as Justice Chin argued in Grafton, Georgia and California may
protect the right to a jury by applying strict standards of waiver.
II. COMPARISON OF FEDERAL INTERESTS WITH GEORGIA’S AND
CALIFORNIA’S INTERESTS
A. Federal Courts have an Interest in Enforcing Agreements that Reduce
the Expense and Delay of Litigation
Federal courts have a paramount interest in enforcing private
agreements. Congress has declared a strong public policy in favor of
freedom of contract, reflected in the primary purpose of the FAA, “to  
enforce private agreements into which parties had entered, a concern which
requires that [federal courts] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”126
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that freedom of contract is a  “sacred”  
liberty of the citizen and it is “paramount”  that  courts  take  care  “not lightly
to interfere with [it].”127 The Court also said that the “usual   and   most  
important function of courts”   is to protect   the   parties’   legitimate  
expectations where the agreement does not violate law or public policy.128
Federal courts have an even stronger interest in promoting freedom to
enter into agreements that resolve disputes efficiently. Federal procedure is
designed   “to   secure   the   just,   speedy, and inexpensive determination of

552 P.2d 1178, 1186–87 (Cal. 1976).
Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 486 (Cal. 2005).
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625–26 (1985)
(internal quotations omitted).
127 Baltimore & Oh. Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) (internal quotations omitted).
128 See id. (internal quotations omitted).
124
125
126
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every  action.”129 Congress supported arbitration agreements because they
save the time and expense of litigating in a judicial forum. 130 Jury trials
cost much more for courts and litigants than bench trials. Eliminating the
jury has been shown to reduce trial time by fifty percent.131 Thus,
contractual jury waivers, like arbitration agreements, serve one of the main
purposes of the justice system by making litigation more efficient.132
By resolving disputes efficiently, contractual jury waivers also help
the larger economy. Parties that have more control over their disputes have
a deeper satisfaction with the judicial process.133 Thus, they are more
likely to enter into and rely on their agreements. Courts that enforce
parties’   legitimate expectations thus promote reliance and certainty in the
marketplace.134 Further, the waivers avoid the costs of grossly excessive
verdicts  granted  by  ‘runaway  juries.’135 Lastly, businesses that avoid these
costs can reduce the charges that they pass on to consumers.136
B.

Georgia’s  and  California’s Interests in Barring Contractual Jury
Waivers

Georgia and California have an interest in barring contractual jury
waivers. Both of these states’  constitutions  require  that  the right to a jury
be preserved “inviolate,”  and  both  Bank South and Grafton emphasized its
importance.137 The right to a jury is firmly rooted in American history and
jurisprudence.138 But, despite its importance, the Seventh Amendment has
never been essential enough to the justice system to be incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states.139
Georgia and California also have an interest in protecting the right to a
jury.140 But contractual jury waivers are most often used between

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 (1924), at 1–2  (“Arbitration  agreements  
are purely matters of contract, and the effect of the bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to
his agreement[,] . . . reducing technicality, delay and expense to a minimum and at the same time
safeguarding  the  rights  of  the  parties.”).
131 See Graham C. Lilly, The Decline of the American Jury, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 57–58
(2001).
132 See Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 481–85 (2007).
133 See id. at 479–81.
134 Cf. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972).
135 See Lilly, supra note 131, at 56–57 n.12.
136 Cf. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991).
137 See supra Part I.F.
138 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485–86 (1935).
See generally Elizabeth Thornburg,
Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 181, 183–84 (discussing the importance and purposes of the civil
jury in American history).
139 Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury
Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 21–22 (2003).
140 See supra Part I.E.
129
130
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sophisticated parties, such as in equipment leases and commercial loans.141
These waivers are sometimes used in franchise or employee agreements,
where there may be an imbalance of bargaining power.142 But courts have
discretion to police agreements to prevent unfair bargaining, thus obviating
the need for a complete bar on all contractual jury waivers. Further, the
knowing and voluntary standard applicable to such waivers is so strict that
there is a “far  greater  likelihood  that  the  waiver  was  agreed  to  as  part  of  a  
mutually beneficial contractual arrangement and far less danger of
overreaching  and  duress  by  the  party  seeking  to  enforce  the  waiver.”143
III. THE ERIE DOCTRINE: THE ‘UNGUIDED’ AND ‘GUIDED’ TESTS
A.

The  ‘Unguided’  Erie Test

The Erie doctrine comes from the seminal U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.144 In Erie, the plaintiff sued a
railroad in a federal diversity action for negligence after he was struck and
injured by a train.145 The railroad defended that it owed him no duty of
care as a trespasser under Pennsylvania common law.146 The court of
appeals, however, affirmed   the   trial   court’s   ruling   that   the   railroad   owed  
him a duty of care under federal common law.147 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed and held that no duty existed because a federal court exercising its
diversity jurisdiction must apply the substantive law of the state.148
The Court looked to the Rules of Decision Act (RDA), which states:
“The  laws  of  the  several  states,  except  where  the  Constitution  or  treaties  of  
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United
States,  in  cases  where  they  apply.”149 In Swift v. Tyson, the Court held that
“the  laws  of  the  several  States”  referred  only  to  legislation,  and  thus  federal
courts were free to develop their own common law.150 Erie overruled this
interpretation and made federal courts bound by state common law as well
as legislation.151 The Court said that the coexistence of federal and state
common law after Swift caused litigants’  substantive  rights  to  be  enforced  

See Zitter, supra note 1, at 53.
See Smith-Johnson Motor Corp. v. Hoffman Motors Corp., 411 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(franchise   agreement);;   Beach   v.   Burns   Int’l   Sec.   Servs., 593 A.2d 1285, 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(employment agreement).
143 L  &  R  Realty  v.  Conn.  Nat’l  Bank,  715  A.2d  748,  754–55 (Conn. 1998).
144 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
145 Id. at 69.
146 Id. at 69–70.
147 Id. at 70.
148 Id. at 72–73.
149 Id. at 71; 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000).
150 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842).
151 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79.
141
142
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differently in state and federal court.152 This difference violated the Equal
Protection Clause by encouraging non-citizens—who alone may remove a
lawsuit to federal court—to  ‘forum-shop’  for  the  most  favorable  law.153
Under Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the
substantive law of the state.154 But these courts are independent and
sovereign, having “strong  inherent  power” over matters of procedure155 and
an   “interest   in   the   integrity   of   their   own   processes.”156 The distinction
between  substance  and  procedure  is  “one  of  the  modern  cornerstones of our
federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of
judicial   power   between   the   state   and   federal   systems.” 157 But the line
between the two shifts, depending on the context.158 Federal courts must,
therefore, carefully draw the line to avoid infringing on state sovereignty
over substance or federal sovereignty over procedure.
The unguided Erie test has three prongs. First, a federal court is not
required  to  follow  state  law  that  is  ‘procedural.’159 ‘Procedural’ rights are
defined  as  “the  judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for
disregard or infraction of them.”160 ‘Substantive’   rights,   in   contrast,   are  
defined as those rights that, together with their corresponding duties,
control  citizens’  “primary  private  activity”  in  everyday  life.161
Second, even  state  law  that  is  ‘procedural’ must be applied if it would
substantially affect the result of litigation.162 In Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. York, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant
pursuant to the New York statute of limitations.163 The court of appeals
reversed pursuant to a federal equitable practice of ignoring the state
statute.164 The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing, held that the federal court
must apply the state rule.165 The Court conceded that a statute of
limitations may be classified as ‘procedural,’   but opined that Erie still
requires that the outcome of litigation be substantially the same in both

Id. at 74–75.
See id.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See id. at 472–73   (“Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of
Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of those rules will
inevitably differ   from   comparable   state   rules.”);;   see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring)
(“[N]o  one  doubts  federal  power  over  procedure.”).
156 Semtek  Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
157 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring).
158 See id. at 471–72 (majority opinion).
159 See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
160 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
161 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 474–75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
162 York, 326 U.S. at 109.
163 Id. at 100.
164 Id. at 100–01.
165 Id. at 110.
152
153
154
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state and federal court.166 A federal court that enforced a state statute of
limitations would, by barring recovery, “vitally”  affect  the  enforcement  of  
the  parties’  substantive rights in violation of Erie.167
The Court gave unprecedented deference to state ‘procedural’  rules in
the aftermath of York.168 The Court in Hanna v. Plumer, conceding that its
deference in this period was too liberal, noted that, because even the most
minor procedural difference can ultimately affect the outcome of a case, the
York standard is not meant to be used as a  “talisman.”169 The other ‘aim’ of
Erie, the Court explained, was to prevent forum-shopping.170 Thus, a court
must consider both whether a difference between federal and state law
would be outcome-determinative and whether this difference would
substantially influence  a  litigant’s  choice  of  forum.171
Third, state law, even if outcome-determinative, must not be applied if
federal interests outweigh the state’s  interests.    In  Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electrical Cooperative, Inc., an injured electrical lineman sued his
employer for negligence.172 The employer raised the affirmative defense
that the plaintiff’s remedy was limited to the   worker’s   compensation  
statute.173 The South Carolina Supreme Court said that this statute required
a judge to decide whether the plaintiff was a  statutory  ‘employee.’174 But
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a jury must decide this factual issue.175
The Court reasoned that the South Carolina court’s  rule  was not “bound  up  
with”  the  plaintiff’s substantive right to recover under the statute, but was
only  a  “form  and  mode”  of  enforcing that right.176 The Court also said that,
under the York standard, there  was  no  “certainty”  or  “strong  possibility”  of  
a different outcome if a jury decided the defense.177

Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
See Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 534 (1949) (holding that state
law controlled when an action is commenced for purposes of satisfying the statute of limitations);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (holding that state law determined
whether an arbitration agreement was enforceable).
169 380 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1965).
170 Id. at 467.
171 Id. at 468.
172 356 U.S. 525, 526 (1958).
173 Id. at 527.
174 Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 96 S.E.2d 566, 571 (S.C. 1957).
175 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
176 Id. at 536.
177 Id. at 539–40. The Court said:
We have discussed the problem upon the assumption that the outcome of the litigation may
be substantially affected by whether the issue of immunity is decided by a judge or a jury.
But clearly there is not present here the certainty that a different result would follow . . . or
even the strong possibility that this would be the case . . . . We do not think the likelihood
of a different result is so strong as to require the federal practice of jury determination of
disputed factual issues to yield to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome.
Id.
166
167
168
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But the Court, retracting its post-York deference to state law, said that
it would not apply the state rule even if it were outcome-determinative.178
The Court reasoned that the Seventh Amendment commanded—or at least
influenced—the federal custom of having a jury decide disputed issues of
fact.179 The interest in preserving this practice, the Court said, was an
“affirmative   countervailing   consideration”   that   outweighed   the   state’s
interest in ensuring substantial uniformity of outcome.180
B.

The  ‘Guided’  Erie Test

The alternative, ‘guided’  Erie test comes from Hanna v. Plumer.181 In
Hanna,   the   court   of   appeals   affirmed   the   district   court’s   dismissal   of   a  
personal injury suit on grounds that the manner of service of process was
insufficient.182 Massachusetts law required personal service of process, but
service was instead made to   an   individual   at   the   defendant’s   residence,  
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1).183 The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed and held that service was adequate.184 The Court said, in
dicta, that the York outcome-determinative test would probably not require
application of the state rule governing service of process.185
The Court went on to   say,   however,   that   an   ‘unguided’ Erie test is
inappropriate for a Federal Rule.186 The Court observed that the U.S.
Constitution grants Congress the power to fashion rules of procedure for
the federal courts.187 Congress, by the Rules Enabling Act (REA),
delegated authority to the Court to promulgate rules   of   “practice   and  
procedure”  for  the   federal  courts that do   not   “abridge,   enlarge,   or   modify  
any   substantive   right.”188 Thus, a Federal Rule controls if it satisfies the
requirements of the REA and the U.S. Constitution.189 A Federal Rule
passes   muster   under   the   REA   as   long   as   it   is   “rationally   capable of
classification”190 as   procedural   and   does   not   “abridge,   enlarge,   or   modify  
any  substantive  right.”191 The Court found that Rule 4(d)(1) satisfied these
requirements and thus controlled the manner of service of process.192

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id. at 537–38.
Id. at 537.
Id. at 537–38.
See 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
Id. at 462–63.
Id. at 461–62.
Id. at 474.
Id. at 466.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 464 (quoting Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958)).
Id. at 474.
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IV. THE ERIE DOCTRINE REQUIRES FEDERAL COURTS TO APPLY FEDERAL
LAW ON CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS
A.

The Erie Doctrine Applies because there is a Federal-State Conflict

As a preliminary matter, there is a conflict between Georgia and
California law on contractual jury waivers and federal law. In Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., a copy machine dealer filed suit against
a manufacturer under a dealership agreement.193 The defendant moved to
transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. section 1404, pursuant to a forum
selection clause in the agreement.194 The motion was denied because
Alabama law barred such clauses.195 The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing,
found that there was a direct Erie conflict between federal and state law.196
The Court reasoned that the statute allows a federal court to consider a
forum selection clause as a factor in deciding whether to transfer the case,
but the Alabama rule did not allow the court to consider the clause at all.197
Under the reasoning in Ricoh, federal law on contractual jury waivers
is in direct conflict with Georgia and California law. As the venue statute
at issue in Ricoh allows a court to consider various factors in determining
whether to transfer the case, federal law on contractual jury waivers allows
a federal court to consider various factors in determining whether the
parties are entitled to a jury. In contrast, as the Alabama rule prohibited
consideration of the forum selection clause in Ricoh, Georgia and
California law prohibit any consideration of the contractual waiver.
B.

The  Supreme  Court’s  Erie Decision, Simler v. Conner, Controls

In Simler v. Conner, the Supreme Court commanded that, in an Erie
context,  “the  right  to  a  jury  trial  in  the  federal  courts  is  to  be  determined  as  
a matter of  federal  law.”198 The command is clear that federal law governs
all Seventh Amendment issues in federal courts. Therefore, Simler
requires a federal court sitting in diversity to apply federal law to determine
whether the Seventh Amendment right may be waived. Thus, federal
courts routinely rely on the Simler rule in applying the knowing and
voluntary standard rather than conflicting state law.199
One federal court in Texas refused to follow Georgia law under Bank
South in determining whether a contractual jury waiver is enforceable. In
487 U.S. 22, 24 (1988).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id.
372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
E.g.,   Med.   Air   Tech.   Corp.   v.   Marwan   Inv.,   Inc.,   303   F.3d   11,   18   (1st   Cir.   2002)   (“In   a  
diversity jurisdiction suit, the enforcement of a jury waiver is a question of federal,  not  state,  law.”).
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
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RDO Financial Services v. Powell, the plaintiff sought to enforce a jury
trial waiver in a guaranty agreement.200 The defendant argued that, under
the persuasive authority of Bank South, the waiver was unconstitutional.201
But the court applied federal law in holding that the waiver was not
knowing and voluntary.202 The court reasoned that, although Simler’s  
precise holding concerned whether a claim is characterized as legal or
equitable, federal courts have “routinely”   applied   the knowing and
voluntary standard to contractual jury waivers.203
The same court later refused to follow California law under Grafton in
determining whether a contractual jury waiver is enforceable.
In
TransFirst Holdings, Inc. v. Phillips, the defendant employees argued that,
under Grafton, the plaintiff employer could not enforce a jury waiver
provision in an employment agreement providing that California law
governed.204 The court disagreed and held that the waiver was knowing
and voluntary under federal law.205 The court reasoned that, under Simler
and its earlier decision in Powell, “[t]he right to a jury trial in a federal
court is clearly a question of federal law.”206
Only one federal court has followed state law in determining whether
a contractual jury waiver is enforceable. In IFC Credit Corp. v. United
Business and Industrial Federal Credit Union, the Seventh Circuit held that
Illinois law controlled the enforceability of a contractual jury waiver in an
equipment lease.207 The court reasoned:
Simler holds  that  the  classification  of  a  dispute  as  “legal”  or  “equitable”  must be
made under federal norms . . . . It does not follow that national law also controls
the validity of a contractual agreement to a bench trial. There is no general
federal law of contracts after Erie R.R. v. Tompkins;;  if  ‘federal  law’  did  control,  
the best it could do would be to use state law as the rule of decision. 208

This reasoning is unsound for three reasons. First, the  court’s reading
of Simler is too narrow. Federal law must also control the enforceability of
contractual jury waivers because the exercise of the Seventh Amendment
must, under Simler, be uniform. Second, while federal courts cannot make
generally applicable contract law, they may fashion rules to determine
whether rights under federal statutes may be waived.209 Thus, the knowing
and voluntary standard may determine whether the Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial may be waived. Third, “state law may be incorporated
200
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RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 812 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 812–14.
Id. at 813 n.5.
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20483, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2007).
Id. at *10.
Id. at *7 (internal quotations omitted).
512 F.3d 989, 991 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 991–92 (internal citation omitted).
See Kendall v. City of Chesapeake, 174 F.3d 437, 441 n.1 (4th Cir. 1999).
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as the federal rule of decision”   only   “when there is little need for a
nationally uniform body of law.”210 The need to ensure uniformity in
Seventh Amendment law, therefore, precludes incorporation of state law.
C.

Even if Simler did not Control, the Federal Arbitration Act would
Control under  a  ‘Guided’  Erie Test

Under  a  ‘guided   Erie test, federal courts must apply a federal statute
that is broad enough to cover the issue and that is a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under the U.S. Constitution to regulate procedure for the
federal courts.211 The FAA satisfies both prongs of this test and thus
requires federal courts to enforce contractual jury waivers.
First, the FAA is broad enough to cover the issue. A contractual jury
waiver is an implicit part of an arbitration agreement.212 State laws that bar
contractual jury waivers would, therefore, bar arbitration agreements as
well.213 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has used the FAA to preempt state
laws restricting contractual jury waivers. For example, in Southland Corp.
v. Keating, the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause in a
franchise agreement was unenforceable under the California Franchise
Investment Law, which prohibited waiver of the rights therein.214 The
court reasoned that the arbitration agreement waived the statutory right to a
jury.215 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California law
was void under the Supremacy Clause.216 If the FAA preempts state laws
that bar contractual jury waivers in state courts, it surely must control over
state laws that bar these waivers in federal court.
Second, the FAA is a valid exercise of congressional power to
regulate procedure. Although Southland and its progeny gave the FAA a
substantive dimension, Congress enacted the FAA pursuant to its
constitutional power to regulate federal procedure.217 The FAA also does
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights.218
See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979).
Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 26–27 (1988).
See supra Part I.A.
See Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Okla. 1987) (Opala, J., concurring) (citing OKLA.
CONST.  art.  XXIII,  §  8,  under  which  “express  or  implied   contractual waivers of a constitutional right
appear   to   be   unenforceable[,]”   and   surmising   that   this   provision   would   similarly bar an arbitration
agreement  “as  an  implicit  waiver  of  [the]  fundamental  right  to  a  trial  by  jury”).
214 See 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); CAL. CORP. CODE §   31512   (West   2008)   (“Any condition,
stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with
any  provision  of  this  law  or  any  rule  or  order  hereunder  is  void.”).
215 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10.
216 See id. at 16. After Southland, the Court routinely used the FAA to preempt state laws that
restricted arbitration agreements. See David S. Schwartz, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Power of
Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 546–54 (2004).
217 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96  (1924),  at  1  (“Whether an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced
or not is a question  of  procedure  .  .  .  .”).
218 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473   U.S.   614,   628   (1985)   (“By  
agreeing to arbitrate . . . a party does not forgo the substantive rights . . . it only submits to their
210
211
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213
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D. Even if the Federal Arbitration Act did not Control, the ‘Unguided’
Erie Test would still Require Application of Federal Law
1. Federal Law on Contractual Jury Waivers is Procedural
The U.S. Supreme Court in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Cooperative said that whether a judge or a jury decided factual issues
relevant to an affirmative defense in a negligence case was not “bound  up”
with   the   parties’   substantive rights   but   only   a   “form   and   mode” of
enforcing them.219 Thus, under Byrd, whether a judge or jury decides
factual issues relevant to claims in a contract dispute is not “bound up”
with  the  parties’  substantive  rights  under  the  agreement  but  is only a “form
and mode” of enforcing them.
The   Court’s   definition   of   ‘procedure’   supports   this   conclusion.
Substantive rights govern   the   parties’   primary   activity   under   a contract,
including mutual promises, performances, and remedies for breach.
Procedural rights, on the other hand, govern the judicial process by which
those rights are enforced.220 The right to a jury is procedural because it
concerns who determines which party is entitled to a remedy. This right
does not become substantive simply because it is part of the agreement—“a  
contract about procedure remains a matter of procedure.”221
A ‘procedural’  rule  is “bound  up” with substantive rights only when a
state declares an   “integral”   relationship   between   the two.222 Georgia and
California have not, by judicial decision or statute, suggested that the
parties’  rights  under  an  agreement  would  be  affected  if  a judge, rather than
a jury, determined the factual issues under an agreement. Thus, there is no
integral relationship between Georgia and California law on contractual
jury waivers and  the  parties’  rights  under  substantive  law.
2. Federal Law on Contractual Jury Waivers is not OutcomeDeterminative
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Cooperative that whether a judge or jury decides factual issues relevant to
claims in a negligence case would not substantially affect the outcome of
the litigation.223 Whether a judge or jury decides factual issues relevant to
the   parties’   claims   in   a   contract   dispute   will   also, therefore, not
substantially affect the outcome of the litigation. The   Court’s   Erie
jurisprudence on arbitration agreements supports this conclusion.

resolution in an arbitral, rather  than  a  judicial,  forum.”).
219 356 U.S. 525, 535–36 (1958).
220 See Schwartz, supra note 216, at 615–20.
221 Id. at 618.
222 See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
223 Id. at 539–40.
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In Wilko v. Swan, a purchaser of securities brought suit for
misrepresentation under the Securities Act of 1933.224 The district court
held that an arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the Securities
Act provided a special right of recovery in a judicial forum.225 The Court
agreed, holding that the arbitration agreement would deprive the plaintiff of
its remedy under the Act.226 The Court reasoned that the choice of forum
was a substantial right under the Act, because its protections applied much
less in an arbitral forum.227 The Court noted that arbitrators are not
instructed in the law, and review of their decisions is limited.228
The Court maintained this view in its post-York period of deference to
state law. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, the district court
denied   the   employer’s   motion   to   enforce   an   arbitration   clause in the
employment agreement because Vermont law made arbitration agreements
revocable.229 The court of appeals reversed, reasoning  that  “[a]rbitration  is  
merely  a  form  of  trial,”  and  thus enforcing the arbitration agreement would
not  infringe  on  the  parties’  substantive  rights.230 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed because New York law may have governed it instead.231 But the
Court   also   disagreed   with   the   court   of   appeals’   classification   of   an  
arbitration agreement as a mere procedural matter:
If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the
outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where the suit is brought.
For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially
affects the cause of action created by the State. The nature of the tribunal where
suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.
The change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical
difference in ultimate result.232

The Court explained that arbitration offers fewer procedural
protections than trial.233 For example, arbitration offers no right to trial by
jury under the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators are not instructed in the
law; the record of their proceedings is not as complete; and judicial review
of their decisions is limited.234
In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,235 the
Court abrogated its previous view in Wilko and Bernhardt. Mitsubishi
224 346 U.S. 427, 428 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
225 Id. at 430–31.
226 See id. at 435.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 436.
229 350 U.S. 198, 199–200 (1956).
230 See id. at 200, 202 (internal quotations omitted).
231 Id. at 205.
232 Id. at 203.
233 Id.
234 Id. (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–38 (1953)).
235 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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involved an antitrust dispute over an international contract between an
automobile manufacturer and distributor.236 The Court affirmed the district
court’s   grant   of   Mitsubishi’s   motion   to   enforce an arbitration agreement
and ruled that claims under federal antitrust statutes are arbitrable.237 The
Court reasoned: “By  agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”238
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court
squarely rejected its view in Wilko and Bernhardt.239 In Rodriguez,
securities investors brought suit against a brokerage firm for violations of
the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934.240 The district
court held that, under Wilko,  the  investors’ claims under the Securities Act
were not arbitrable.241 The court of appeals reversed.242 The U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed.243 The Court admitted that its view that arbitration would
substantially affect the outcome of litigation was outmoded and pervaded
by  “the  old  judicial hostility to arbitration.”244
According to Wilko and Bernhardt, arbitration has many differences
from a bench trial, including the right to trial by jury. But under Mitsubishi
and Rodriquez, these differences do not substantially affect the outcome of
litigation. A jury trial, on the other hand, has only one procedural
difference from a bench trial, the right to a jury. Under these decisions,
therefore, federal law on contractual jury waivers is even less outcomedeterminative than federal law on arbitration agreements.
One may argue that federal law on contractual jury waivers, even if
not outcome-determinative, will influence litigants to remove to federal
court to enforce them. But a rule that does not substantially influence the
outcome is unlikely to substantially influence the choice of forum.245 And
even a rule that causes forum-shopping does not violate Erie if it is not
outcome-determinative. Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna v. Plumer,
explains why too  much  reliance  on  either  ‘aim’  of  Erie is wrong:
The Court   is   quite   right   in   stating   that   the   “outcome-determinative”   test   of  
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, if taken literally, proves too much, for any rule, no
matter  how  clearly  “procedural,”  can  affect  the  outcome  of  litigation  if  it  is  not  
obeyed. In turning from   the   “outcome”   test   of   York   back   to   the   unadorned  
forum-shopping rationale of Erie, however, the Court falls prey to like
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Id. at 616–20.
Id. at 618–20, 629.
Id. at 628.
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
Id. at 478–79.
Id. at 479.
Id.
Id. at 481.
Id. at 480 (internal quotations omitted).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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oversimplification, for a simple-forum shopping rule also proves too much;
litigants often choose a federal forum merely to obtain what they consider the
advantages of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or to try their cases before a
supposedly more favorable judge.246

Mitsubishi and Rodriquez show that federal law on contractual jury
waivers is not outcome-determinative. Thus, any risk of forum-shopping
caused by such waivers is chimerical. But, even if federal law did cause
forum-shopping, it still would not violate Erie,   under   Justice   Harlan’s  
reasoning, without creating substantial differences in outcome.
3. Even if Federal Law on Contractual Jury Waivers was OutcomeDeterminative, Federal Interests would Control.
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently said that the federal interest
in uniformity of the exercise of the Seventh Amendment is paramount. For
example, in Simler v. Conner, the Court commanded that federal law
govern the right to a jury to ensure its uniform exercise as “demanded  by  
the  Seventh  Amendment.”247 Also, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electrical
Cooperative, the Court said that the federal interest in whether a judge or
jury determined factual issues was   “countervailing”   because   of   “the  
influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment.”248 Thus,
federal law governs whether the Seventh Amendment may be waived to
ensure uniformity in its exercise.
Federal courts follow this reasoning in enforcing contractual jury
waivers. For example, in Phoenix Leasing v. Sure Broadcasting, Inc., the
plaintiff lender moved to enforce a jury waiver in a loan agreement against
the borrower.249 The defendant argued that the waiver was unconscionable
under California law, while the plaintiff argued that the knowing and
voluntary standard controlled the waiver’s   validity.250 The court avoided
the Erie question by finding no direct conflict between federal and state
law.251 But the court said, in dicta, that, if there were a conflict, “the  
validity of contractual waivers of . . . [t]he right to a jury trial in federal
court is governed by federal law” under Simler252 because of “[t]he  need  to  
ensure the uniformity of exercise of the Seventh Amendment  right.”253
Federal interests in enforcing agreements that allow parties to resolve
their disputes efficiently are also paramount. In Stewart Organization v.
Ricoh Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law determined
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Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963).
356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958).
843 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (D. Nev. 1994).
Id. at 1383.
See id. at 1386.
Id. at 1384.
Id. at 1386.
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whether a forum selection clause was enforceable in federal court.254
Justice Kennedy, concurring, stated:
The federal judicial system has a strong interest . . . not only to spare litigants
unnecessary costs but also to relieve courts of time-consuming pretrial motions.
Courts should announce and encourage rules that support private parties who
negotiate such clauses. Though state policies should be weighed in the balance,
the authority and prerogative of the federal courts to determine the issue . . .
should be exercised so that a valid forum-selection clause is given controlling
weight in all but the most exceptional cases.255

Contractual jury waivers support the same interests as forum selection
clauses because both agreements reduce the expense and delay of litigation.
Thus, under   Justice   Kennedy’s   reasoning,   federal interests in enforcing
contractual jury waivers control over  Georgia’s  and  California’s  interests  in  
barring them, unless the most exceptional case applies.
This is not an exceptional case, for three reasons. First, federal law
provides extraordinary protection for the right to a jury. The knowing and
voluntary standard is so much stricter than the contract law applied to other
pre-dispute agreements that a criminal defendant may waive his or her most
basic constitutional rights under it.256 Even the Grafton court admired the
extraordinary protection that this standard provides and seemed to suggest
that the California Legislature adopt it.257 This   standard’s   extraordinary
strictness virtually guarantees that a waiver is fairly bargained for.258
Second, the protection that federal law provides for the right to a jury
is more than adequate. As Congress stated in the legislative history to the
FAA, “The  constitutional  right  to  a  jury  trial  is  adequately  safeguarded”  by
arbitration agreements.259 If ordinary contract law applicable to such
agreements provides adequate protection when the parties may not even
realize that they are waiving the right to a jury, the knowing and voluntary
standard must provide more than adequate protection when the waiver is
conspicuous and freely bargained for.
Third, federal law provides better protection for the right to a jury than
Georgia and California law. Georgia and California law encourage parties
that wish to waive the right to a jury to turn to arbitration agreements
instead. The contract law applicable to such agreements provides minimal
protection for this right. The knowing and voluntary standard, on the other
hand, stems the tide to arbitration and more than adequately protects this
right. Thus, federal courts can best protect the right to a jury by continuing
to enforce contractual jury waivers under federal law.
254
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487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988).
Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
See supra note 52.
See Grafton Partners, L.P. v. Superior Court, 116 P.3d 479, 491 (Cal. 2005).
See supra note 143.
S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924).
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CONCLUSION
This Comment proposes that the Erie doctrine requires federal courts
sitting in diversity in Georgia and California to continue to enforce
contractual jury waivers under federal law. The Erie doctrine applies
because federal courts enforce these waivers, while the supreme courts of
Georgia and California have barred them. In Simler v. Conner, the U.S.
Supreme Court commanded that federal law governs the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial. Thus, federal courts must continue to
enforce contractual jury waivers if they were knowing and voluntary.
Alternatively, this Comment proposes that the FAA also requires
federal courts to enforce these waivers, because it satisfies both prongs of
the  ‘guided’  Erie test. First, the FAA is broad enough to cover the issue by
making arbitration agreements enforceable, because contractual jury
waivers are implicit parts of such agreements. The FAA must conflict with
state laws restricting contractual jury waivers in federal court because it
preempts such laws in state courts. Second, the FAA is a valid exercise of
congressional power to regulate procedure in the federal courts.
This Comment further proposes that federal common law controls
because,  under  the  Court’s  Erie jurisprudence, it satisfies the three prongs
of the ‘unguided’   Erie test. First, whether a judge or jury determines a
dispute is a matter of procedure. Second, federal law would not
substantially affect the outcome of the litigation, especially if arbitration
agreements do not. Third, even if federal law were outcome-determinative,
federal interests in enforcing agreements that resolve disputes efficiently
outweigh state interests, absent the most exceptional case. This is not an
exceptional case where Georgia’s   and   California’s interests in protecting
the right to a jury control, because the   ‘knowing   and   voluntary’   standard
more than adequately protects those interests.
Two legal developments must occur as a result of this thesis. First,
the Ninth Circuit has granted review to a California district court’s ruling
that contractual jury waivers are enforceable under federal law, despite
Grafton.260 If the Ninth Circuit reverses, the U.S. Supreme Court should
grant certiorari and reverse the Ninth Circuit decision. Second, the Georgia
and California legislatures should overturn Bank South and Grafton by
making these enforceable with appropriate safeguards. Georgia and
California must not curtail the freedom to enter into agreements that serve
important public interests. In an era of customized litigation, the view that
some rights are too sacred to be bargained for is a thing of the past.

260 Applied Elastomerics, Inc. v. Z-Man Fishing Prods., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1044 (N.D.
Cal.  2007)  (“The right to a jury trial in federal court is governed by federal law and, under federal law,
parties may contractually waive their right to a jury trial.”),  appeal docketed, No. 07-17170 (9th Cir.
Nov. 29, 2007).

